Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four A

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Child support calculation Hypothetical Number Two

B> A division of the benefit "in-kind," also called an "if, as, and when" division, maybe the  preferable form of dividing retirement benefits. It has the advantages of fully and fairly dividing the actual benefit received without speculation as to actuarial valuation, inflation, life expectancies, etc. Preferred or not, such a division may be necessary if the "present value" of the retirement is so large that there is no other asset that could be traded for the spousal share. Where the wife did not have an opportunity to litigate right to support in foreign divorce action, she was not precluded from later maintaining action for support against the husband. A valid  ex parte divorce entered at the domicile of only one party to the marriage does not automatically end the wife’s right to support. The confusion stemmed from a series of Nevada Supreme Court opinions which seemingly advocated "equal distribution."1 At the same time, however, the Court had issued decisions rebuffing appeals from orders dividing property unequally.2 Generally, these are law-and-motion type hearings, but judges vary considerably in their handling of the matters. Some conduct spontaneous trials at the initial hearing, allowing presentation of evidence, witness testimony, etc. Some prefer to directly question the petitioner and respondent. Some insist on setting a second hearing, and giving both sides time to prepare and present the case like a normal trial, with abbreviated time schedules. Counsel’s familiarity with the preferences and peccadilloes of particular jurists is believed more important in this regard than any precedential history under Hague Convention practice. In 2001, the Arizona Court of Appeals again dealt with the contract theory, federal law supremacy assertion, and claims of "involuntariness" that appeared in several of the cases discussed above, in Danielson v. Evans.1 Because the divorce at issue occurred after Mansell, the prevailing former spouse in Danielson was held to the "higher standard of clarity" in the underlying decree (discussed above) to protect her interests. Many courts hearing such cases when Mansell was decided did exactly what the California trial court did on remand in that case, issuing opinions that detailed why they would not allow the inequity of allowing post-divorce status changes by members to partially or completely divest their former spouses, where the original divorce decree had been issued prior to the Mansell decision.4 The parties were divorced in California. The father was ordered to pay $200 per month in child support. In September 1994, a California court ordered the father to pay the $200 per month and, pay $425 per month toward the amount the arrears. The arrears amounted to approximately $20,000. The parties both subsequently relocated to Nevada.  In February 1996, the father received notice that he was in arrears and that $625 per month would be withheld from his wages. Later, a hearing master conducted a hearing to determine whether the father’s driver’s license should be revoked for failure to pay support. The master recommended that the father pay $5,625 within 30 days and continue paying $625 per month.  The father appealed. The district court determined that the father was not more than 12 months behind in his child support. The district court also determined that the suspension of his driver’s license was unjustified and counterproductive. The "dual receipt" prohibition in federal law was long a source of troubling inequities in military retirement benefits cases, and led to a large number of "dual comp" cases involving waiver of military retirement benefits. Those inequities were (apparently) solved when Congress repealed the "dual compensation" law, effective October I, 1999.280 Most ofthis section is therefore ofprimarily historical interest, or for purpose of analogies drawn to other areas still litigated (such as disability offsets). Neither Truax nor Mosley defines the term "joint physical custody," nor do they provide clear, cogent, and unambiguous analysis or discussion of the meaning of the terms at issue here. In 1986, Congress amended the USFSPA so that State courts could order that former spouses be members’ beneficiaries.1 If a member elects, or is "deemed" by a court to have elected, to provide the SBP to a former spouse, the member’s current spouse and children of that spouse cannot be beneficiaries.2 Generally, an election to make a former spouse an SBP beneficiary is not revocable; if the election was pursuant to court order, a superseding court order is necessary to change it.3 Second, there is the "default" - what would happen if the court deemed the former spouse to be the SBP beneficiary, at the full base amount, but took no steps to alter the ramifications of that election. The spouse would be "over-secured," to a greater or lesser extent.2 The smaller the lifetime interest of the former spouse happened to be, the larger the share of the premium that the member would pay.3 If the member died first, payments to the spouse would increase from $233.75 to $550.00. If the spouse died first, payments to the member would increase from $701.25 to $1,000.00. bsp;               (1)    the party seeking to move must demonstrate that an actual advantage will be realized by both the child and the custodial parent as a result of the move.  If the threshold requirement is met, the court must then examine the following additional factors and their impact on family members. The purpose of the uniform acts is to provide certainty as to jurisdictional decisions - once facts are known (by admission or judicial decision), only one jurisdictional result should ever be possible under the rules they establish. By extending the objective 6-month look-back period set out in the UCCJEA by a totally subjective period in which the left-behind parent claimed she "thought" the children were "temporarily" absent, however, the Court has made determination of child custody jurisdiction in Nevada far more uncertain and subjective than the uniform act tries to make it. Next, determine the member’s "home of record" with the military. According to the Legal Assistance Policy Division of the U.S. Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps, the "Home of Record" is merely the State of residence of a member when the member entered the service of the armed forces. This may, or may not, be the same as the member’s domicile - the place that, when the member eventually goes "home," he will return to. In actuality, "Home of Record" is used for military purposes solely for the purpose of determining the amount of moving expenses that will be provided to a member and his family upon termination of military service. It can and often is changed, but sometimes members simply don’t get around to changing this notation for many years during active duty service. It is possible that a spouse may not even know how to find a member stationed elsewhere. With a full name and Social Security Number, however, some footwork may be able to track a reassigned member from the last known duty station to a current posting. The Legal Assistance Attorney at the military installation nearest the spouse (or the member’s last posting) may be able to provide the necessary information.2 There is also a Worldwide Military Locator Service3 for each branch of service, which may help locate a member or Having the member bear the entire premium would only appear to be a correct result if the court determined, based on the entirety of the parties' economic positions, that the result was mandated as a matter of disparity of income. Similarly, it would be improper to have the former spouse bear the entirety of the SBP premiums, at least in those states in which the courts are required to equally distribute marital property and debts, because the benefit being accorded to the member in the event of the spouse's death is greater, and there is no cost to that survivorship interest. PRACTICE TIP: When money is owed for both retired pay and for child support, it is usually wise to get the retired pay as property started first (even if it means sending in two DD-2293 forms, a couple weeks apart). The reason to do so is that retired pay arrears cannot be garnished from future retired pay, but arrears in child support can - through the above-described Social Security garnishment order, a support obligee can get up to 65% of total retired pay, not just the 50% available under a DD-2293 direct payment procedure. So a practitioner taking the long-term approach should get the stream of property payments established quickly, and can always go back and slowly collect the support arrears by getting a garnishment order against an additional 15%. Note that, once established, such a garnishment order can remain in place for the long haul, even if the child emancipates, and the elimination of "current" support frees up in that 65% total that allows for payment of the arrears. One portion of the case law is apparently unanimous. A comprehensive review of the cases throughout the United States reveals that there is no legitimate authority for the proposition that where the divorce decree preceded Mansell, there can ever be a waiver of retired pay by the retiree in favor of VA disability benefits without compensation being required to be paid to the former spouse, dollar for dollar, as to all sums the retiree’s actions caused to be diverted from her back to him. The court may consider the amount of time that the parent spends with the child. If the child spends 35% or more of the child's time with the parent not having primary residency, the court shall determine whether an adjustment in child support is appropriate. In calculating the parenting time adjustment, the child's time at school or in day care shall not be considered. To assist the court, the following table may be used to calculate the amount os parenting time adjustment. The adjustment percentage should be averaged if there is more than one child and if the percentages are not the same for each child. The Basic Child Support Obligation (line 0.9) is then multipied by the appropriate Parenting Time Adjustment Percentage using the following table. The Parenting Time Adjustment Percentage and the amount is entered on Line E.2. The case involved an appeal from an order granting the father’s motion for modification of child support, and an order denying the father’s request for summary judgment and resolving a complaint challenging paternity. The parties were married September 1981. The parties’ purported child was born April 1982. In December 1993, the father found out he was not the biological father. In February 1995, the mother sought to reduce arrears to judgment and increase support. In August 1995, it was reconfirmed the father was not the biological father. The district court denied the father’s request for summary judgment. The district court ordered the father to pay support of $1,800 per month and to pay educational costs including tuition. The district court also awarded attorney’s fees to the mother. The district court's order did not state the basis for its award of attorney fees and costs. Thus, if there was no previous order giving a right to the former spouse to be the SBP beneficiary, the one-year deemed election period runs from the date of a post-divorce order concerning the SBP.16 This is true for orders that issued prior to the effective date of the SBP deemed beneficiary law, as well as orders that inadequately attempted to provide for the SBP, or omitted all mention of the benefit.17 In Part Two, Section III(D)(2), the FLS proposes a replacement analysis for the "Rivero Formula" that we believe will achieve the policy goals expressed in the Opinion more effectively,without the unintended consequences specified in the Petition for Rehearing, the Mary Anne Decaria article, and this Brief. We believe it should be adopted for use in joint-but-unequal timeshare situations, as to downward deviations, and in situations where a non-custodial parent is exercising less than a 20% timeshare, as to upward deviations. The Office of Personnel Management ("OPM") Handbook for Attorneys includes a model paragraph entitled "Protecting a former spouse entitled to military retired pay" (paragraph 111). It reads: While partition might be available to a shortchanged former spouse after divorce, that expectation is not much to rely upon. If the law of the relevant state (which may not be the state of divorce, as explained below) does not provide a way to correct the omission of assets from the decree, the only mechanism for recovery for a divested spouse be a malpractice suit against her 2 attorney. The non-uniform and uncertain state of the law governing partition of omitted assets therefore makes it imperative for counsel to seek out pension benefits during the pendency of a divorce as a matter of defensive practice. Awards against attorneys in these cases can be significant. It has been made clear that any attorney practicing divorce law is charged with knowing about the existence, value, and mechanics of dividing any retirement benefits that might exist.  See Aloy v. Mash, 696 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1985); Bross v. Denny, 791 S.W.2d 416 (Mo. Ct. App.1990) ($108,000.00 malpractice award against trial attorney for not knowing that he could seek division of military retirement after change in the law). b) If there is not a court order awarding parenting time, the court shall determine the child support award without consideration of the parenting expense adjustment. If a parenting tirne order is subsequently issued or is issued in the same proceeding, then the child support order shall include application of the parenting expense adjustment. Subd. 2. Calculation of parenting expense adjustment. The obligor is entitled to a parenting expense adjustment calculated as provided in this subdivision. The court shall: (1) find the adjustment percentage corresponding to the percentage of parenting time allowed to the obligor below: B> A division of the benefit "in-kind," also called an "if, as, and when" division, maybe the  preferable form of dividing retirement benefits. It has the advantages of fully and fairly dividing the actual benefit received without speculation as to actuarial valuation, inflation, life expectancies, etc. Preferred or not, such a division may be necessary if the "present value" of the retirement is so large that there is no other asset that could be traded for the spousal share. The following paragraph states that Cost of Living Adjustments are specifically contemplated, and accrue to both the Member's and the Spouse's portions of the benefits. 3) If the presumption of shared physical custody applies pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, either parent may rebut this presumption by proving that the method of calculating the child support obligation based on shared physical custody would be unjust or inappropriate because of the parents' particular arrangements for the custody of the child. If a parent rebuts this presumption, the judicial officer shall calculate the child support obligation based on sole physical custody pursuant to subsection (f) of this section. PAN style="FONT-FAMILY: Times New Roman; FONT-SIZE: 14pt"> The Court indicated that there were two approaches to allocating community and separate property. The first approach was  Pereira v. Pereira, 103 P. 488 (Cal. 1909) wherein the court is to allocate to separate property a reasonable rate of return on the original capital investment. Any increase above the amount arrived at in this fashion is to be allocated to community property. The second approach was  Van Camp v. Van Camp, 199 P. 885 (Cal.App. 1921) wherein the court was to deduct from the total income or increase in value, the amount of reasonable compensation received by the owner of the property for his services rendered. That amount is said to have represented the community interest. The balance is all allocated to separate property. The Court held that district courts were not bound by either the Pereira or the Van Camp approach, but could select whichever would achieve substantial justice between the parties. The Court held that using the Pereira formula was not, in the circumstances of the case, inherently unfair nor contravened substantial justice. P> The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify child custody awards after entry of a decree, irrespective of any express statement of continuing jurisdiction, under the above statute and NRS 125.510 (permitting a determination of custody during the pendency of an action, at the final hearing, or any time thereafter during the child’s minority, and permitting modification or the vacating of any such order, "even if the divorce was obtained by default with an appearance in the action by one of the parties," but providing that the person seeking such an order "shall submit to the jurisdiction of the court.") At its meeting in Mesquite in April, the Nevada District Court Judges’ Association voted to join in the Section’s submission from its own perspective, and hired counsel (Robert Eisenberg of Reno) to request permission to file a separate Amicus brief. That motion was accepted and granted. The Supreme Court reversed. The Court noted that the wife contented that the postnuptial agreement was an integrated agreement, incapable of severance, and that since the support provisions thereof were invalid, the entire agreement failed and could not be enforced in any respect. The agreement limited the husband’s support duty to the period of five years even though they continued living together as husband and wife. The Court held that such provision violated the statute was therefore void. It was unquestioned that the parties continued to live together as husband and wife until the husband’s death. The Court held that the entire integrated agreement must be annulled since a material part of it was illegal. As discussed at length above, the provision in question was adapted from a piece of ERISA, governing private retirements, but without all of the surrounding provisions which collectively permit the splitting off of a spousal share into a separate interest payable based on the life expectancy, etc., of the spouse. As explained by Deputy Attorney General Ray in 1993, the purpose of adopting the language was only to state clearly what PERS would and would not do, not substantively alter divorce law. That interpretation would be consistent with what courts have done regarding "payment at eligibility" case law applied to other retirement systems.

You can find Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four A Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section II Subsection Th Marren and Page Case Lisst Court Ordered Divisions of the TSP Survivorship Benefits for the TSP Documents to Be Filed along with the Initial Petition for Return Las Vegas divorce family law expert Less is More and More is Less More or Less Nevada child custody expert lawyer Divison of Military Retirement Benefits In Divorce Section V Value Altering The Marren and Page Case List Kramer v Kramer NV Ind Dev v Benedetti Blanch Key Concepts in Military Retirement Benefits Rivero State Bar Amicus Brief Approches Relating to Unequal Joint Custody Hedlund Amicus Brief Legal Doctrines at Play in this Appeal Rivero v Rivero Opinion III A Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Hitting the Jackpot in Pension Cases Secrets to Getting the Retirement Shar Death of Member After Retirement and Before Divorce Divorcing the Military and Serving the Civil Service Section III Subsection Family Law and Contingency Fees Time to Reconsider Section IV Rivero v Rivero Section VI A Cases and Trends Recharacterization is Generally Not Permitted Exhibits on Rivero Exhibit Four A available at lvfamilylawyer.com by clicking above.

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